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Perceived assaults on the independence of the judiciary have called new attention to how
courts obtain their funding. Little scholarly activity has examined the question of how courts
negotiate the politics of budgeting in state arenas. Expanding our knowledge in this area is
necessary if we are to understand fully how budgeting affects the ability of the judiciary to ef-
fectively play its vital role as an independent branch in American government. Through the
use of elite interviews with state court administrators, executive budget officers, and legisla-
tive budget analysts in Oklahoma and Virginia, this article examines whether the independ-
ence of state courts is under assault by budgetary politics. The evidence questions whether
state executive and legislative powers of the purse pose serious threats to the independence
of courts.
STATE COURT BUDGETING AND
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE





In his historic commentary, Democracy in America, de Tocqueville
(1835/1956) observed that an independent judiciary vested with the abil-
ity to impartially make rulings “forms one of the most powerful barriers
which has ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies”
(p. 76). Indeed, judicial independence in American politics has been
hailed as one means to preserve individual liberty and minority rights ver-
sus the actions of the more majoritarian branches of government. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist hailed judicial independence as “one of the
crown jewels of our system of government today” (cited in Perry, 1999,
p. 1). Given the trends that have increased state court administration (e.g.,
state versus local funding of courts and court unification), legal profes-
sionals and scholars of the courts have begun to assess an increase in the
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magnitude of judicial independence (see National Center for State Courts,
1998; Wheeler, 1988). In addition, scholars have noted actions by the
other branches that may threaten the independence of courts (Perry,
1999).
In an American Bar Association publication, Perry (1999) warned of
“recent political events [that] have threatened to dim the jewel’s sparkle
and reduce its worth in our constitutional structure” (p. 1). Such political
events have been spurred by criticisms of judges for behaving like “activ-
ists” and/or legislating from the bench. These criticisms are usually lev-
eled when political actors disagree with controversial decisions made by
the courts and have opened the door for increased intervention by the more
political branches of government. Unfortunately for the judicial branch,
its independence appears remarkably vulnerable given the enormous
powers of the other two branches. Chief executives and legislatures have
the ability to appoint, block, delay, and reject nominations of judges based
on ideological concerns (Goldman & Slotnick, 1997, 1999; Hartley &
Holmes, 1997). The legislative branch has the power to limit the discretion
and administrative functioning of courts through actions such as estab-
lishing sentencing guidelines, reforming the law of torts, and creating
rules governing evidence such as rape shield laws (Perry, 1999, pp. 3-4;
see also American Bar Association, 1997). Additionally, the budgetary
authority of the other two branches affords them a powerful punitive
weapon, which can be used in response to unfavorable court decisions
(Bermant & Wheeler, 1995, pp. 845-857; Kaufman, 1999).
Perceived assaults on the independence of the judiciary have called
new attention to how courts obtain their funding. With the movement in
the 1970s and 1980s toward state court unification, there was also move-
ment toward state, rather than local, funding of courts (Baar, 1975a; Tobin &
Hudzik, 1993). One could argue, then, that state funding of courts has
increased the reliance of courts on governors and state legislatures for
their funding. However, little scholarly activity has surrounded the ques-
tion of how courts negotiate the politics of budgeting in state arenas.
Expanding our knowledge in this area is necessary if we are to understand
fully how budgeting affects the ability of the judiciary to effectively play
its vital role as an independent branch in American government. Through
the use of elite interviews with state court administrators, executive bud-
get officers, and legislative budget analysts in Oklahoma and Virginia, this
article examines whether the independence of state courts is under assault
by budgetary politics. Our evidence questions whether state executive and
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In an essay on judicial administration and judicial independence, Rus-
sell Wheeler (1988, p. 36) observed a difference in the views of Hamilton
and Madison toward the role of the judiciary in the American polity. In
The Federalist No. 51, Madison argued that each branch of American gov-
ernment should have “a will of its own’ (quoted in Wheeler, 1988, p. 36)
whereas Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, on judicial review, argued that
the judiciary “may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely
judgement” (quoted in Wheeler, 1988, p. 36). The difference here, accord-
ing to Wheeler (1988, p. 36), is that Madison asserts an ideal of an inde-
pendent judiciary with its own independent judgment, whereas Hamilton
reminds us that the judiciary must rely on the other branches of govern-
ment to assert its will. In the wake of the increase in the bureaucratization
of courts, Wheeler argues that “judicial administration does not provide
the courts with the capability to execute their judgements” but that it does
“stand to provide the judiciary the strength to protect its independence
[against] the other branches” (p. 37).
In budget politics, the tradition of the separate judicial “will” of Madi-
son and the power of “judgement” referred to by Hamilton has provided
the courts a considerable amount of influence over the budgeting power of
the other branches. For example, the courts have affected the funding lev-
els of many government programs through their rulings. Court decisions
in such areas as busing desegregation, requirements for standing to sue,
welfare eligibility, and prison conditions have forced legislatures and gov-
ernors to shift resources between government programs (Axelrod, 1989;
MacManus & Turner, 1993; Straussman, 1986). However, there have been
arguments that assaults on judicial independence by other branches have
hindered court power including that of obtaining the funds necessary to
carry out judicial functions.
Judicial professionals and scholars have demonstrated Wheeler’s
(1988) assertion that effective administration can secure judicial inde-
pendence and protect courts from dependence on other branches.
Recently, there has been an organized campaign by advocates for the
courts to avert assaults on the independence of the judiciary. Groups like
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the American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society have
highlighted threats against the courts and have called attention to the prob-
lems inherent in having an independent judiciary that is dependent on at
least one of the other branches for its funding. Two examples include an
editorial by the American Judicature Society and recent publications by
the American Bar Association highlighting threats to judicial independ-
ence (American Bar Association, 1997; American Bar Association Divi-
sion for Public Education, 1999; American Judicature Society, 1997). The
American Judicature Society’s Center for Judicial Independence includes
“punitive cuts in the budgets of the federal and state judiciary” among its
list of threats to the judiciary (Kaufman, 1999). American Bar Association
publications detail similar concerns at the federal and state levels includ-
ing a general lack of funding for the courts (American Bar Association,
1997; American Bar Association Division for Public Education, 1999).
Evidence from the states suggests that these concerns have merit. The
most recent examples include the New York chief justice filing suit
against the governor and legislature to force them to provide adequate
funding, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordering the legislature to
provide funding to the state’s trial courts (Powers, 1993; Tobin, 1999).
THE FUNDING OF COURTS AND
INTERBRANCH RELATIONS
In general, studies on the politics of state court funding are limited, and
works on how the branches interact to secure judicial funding are rare.
Studies of state court budgeting, however, do exist. Some works have
described and detailed the framework and process of state court budgeting
(Baar, 1975b; Lim, 1987; Tobin, 1996a, 1996b). Other works primarily
describe and advocate approaches that states have adopted to fund their
court facilities (Tobin, 1995). There is also work that discusses the genera-
tion of revenues by courts and the appropriateness of using these fines,
fees, and forfeitures (Bresnick, 1982, 1993; Dimond, 1993). A good deal
of research also has analyzed the reform of shifting from local funding of
state trial courts to unitary state budgeting systems (see Baar, 1975a;
Stout, 1993; Tobin, 1996a; Tobin & Hudzik, 1993). Scant attention, how-
ever, has been paid to the question of how state courts negotiate the politics
of budgeting with respect to the other branches.
Scholars have given some attention to the strategies used by federal
courts to obtain adequate funding (Walker & Barrow, 1985; Yarwood &
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Canon, 1980). It is interesting that these works suggest that the political
nature of the federal budget process places courts at a disadvantage in their
efforts to obtain ample funding, noting that Congress has little incentive to
provide courts with generous budgets because courts do not hand out
political pork or have an active constituency. As to the most common strat-
egies used by courts, Yarwood and Canon (1980) found that the U.S.
Supreme Court attempts to gain congressional favor by submitting fis-
cally conservative requests. They also found that justices often appear at
budget hearings to lobby and add prestige to budget requests. Walker and
Barrow (1985) found that federal courts attempt to maintain credibility
with Congress by submitting conservative requests, providing justifica-
tions for all requests, and showing evidence of sound financial manage-
ment. They also found that courts place judges on judicial budgeting com-
mittees who tend to be from states or districts with senators or
representatives on the congressional appropriations committees and sub-
committees. Thus, federal courts try to ensure that they will have friends
on committees who will listen to their concerns. Finally, the federal courts
also appoint committee members who have experience as state legislators
or members of Congress. This guarantees that members of the judicial
committees will have political knowledge of how legislatures operate.
Similar worries about the effectiveness of the courts in the political
process have come from scholars of state court budgeting. Baar (1975b)
states that the judicial branch is at the mercy of the executive and legisla-
tive branches when attempting to get resources. State courts must rely on
governors and state legislatures, which have strong budgetary powers, to
provide them with funding. These branches can control funding levels,
write appropriations to limit and restrict court discretion, and hinder
attempts by courts to shift money between accounts (Baar, 1975b).
Baar’s (1975b) study also examined determinants of appropriations
success for state courts. In a survey of executive budget officers, he found
that deference to the judiciary as a third branch of government, realistic
judicial requests, and good relations with the legislature were important
factors in judicial budget success. However, Baar (1975b) also found that
executive budget officers often viewed the courts as lacking budgetary
competence. Interviews of executive officials stated that court budget suc-
cess could improve if judicial officials would provide more justification
for court needs and request more money.
In summary, the literature on court funding strategies suggests that
courts are disadvantaged in the budgetary process, and their strategies for
obtaining funds are primarily conservative and often emphasize the
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independent nature of the judiciary as a branch. Reliance on the independ-
ent nature of the judiciary could be considered a political strategy that is
intended to appeal to the other branches’ sense of separation of powers. A
lack of funding or even threats to decrease budgets, then, can lead to argu-
ments that the majoritarian branches are attacking judicial independence.
STATE COURT BUDGETING AND
INTERBRANCH RELATIONS
Threats to court budgets may, in fact, increase given the move from
local to state funding. Past studies of state court budgeting by Baar
(1975b) and Lim (1987) showed that state judicial systems primarily rely
on local governments for much of their funding. However, recent legisla-
tive trends have moved state courts steadily toward state funding (National
Center for State Courts, 1998, p. 7). There has been much debate about
whether states should shift toward or away from state funding of courts
(Tobin, 1996a). Additionally, court budgeting scholars have discussed the
potential effects of state financing on judicial independence. For instance,
Tobin and Hudzik (1993) argue that state funding may increase judicial
independence:
At the roots of all the interbranch issues is the fundamental question of
whether the judiciary is considered a separate branch of government or
treated as an executive branch agency. State financing of trial courts high-
lights this issue and demonstrates that state financing makes the judicial
branch a more visible and powerful entity. (p. 346)
One could also argue, however, that with the increased power of state
courts over their own administration, there has also been an increased reli-
ance on governors and state legislatures for court resources.
As alluded to earlier, the budgetary powers that can be used against the
courts by the executive and legislative branches are considerable. Con-
gress and most state legislatures have the authority to cut court spending in
their appropriations bills and limit court spending discretion through the
use of restrictive line items in those bills. Meanwhile, the president and
most governors have the authority to alter court budget requests in their
executive budgets and veto spending allocated to the courts in appropria-
tions bills. It is well documented that governors and state legislatures are
more than willing to use the budgetary powers at their disposal to force
each other to submit to policy demands (see, e.g., Abney & Lauth, 1998;
Clynch & Lauth, 1991). An excellent example of this behavior is
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displayed in the use of gubernatorial line-item vetoes. Abney and Lauth
(1985) found that governors tend to use their line-item veto power more as
a tool to influence legislators to support their policies than as an instru-
ment of fiscal restraint. Given the propensity of governors and legislators
to behave in such a manner, there is no reason to believe that they will not
behave similarly when dealing with the courts. The courts, after all, influ-
ence policy through their rulings. One way for the executive and legisla-
tive branches to have a say regarding this judicial influence is by employ-
ing their budgetary powers. Threats to judicial budgets could persuade
judges to take the concerns of the other two branches into account when
making their rulings, just as line-item veto threats against legislative pet
projects can persuade individual legislators to take gubernatorial concerns
into account when voting on legislation.
Some argue that executive and legislative budgetary powers place the
independence of the judiciary at the mercy of the executive and legislative
branches. Others, however, have argued that such powers are simply
“checks” and have emphasized that the powers of government are
“shared” (see Fisher, 1988; Rosenberg, 1991). With such attention to
threats to the independence of courts, it is remarkable that little empirical
attention has been paid to the politics of funding courts.
One reason may be that the state procedures for budgeting can be com-
plicated and are quite diverse (Tobin & Hudzik, 1993, p. 352). Without the
basic knowledge needed to describe how budget actors interact at the state
level, it is difficult to adequately form hypotheses about state court budget
strategies and relations with other branches. The lack of basic information
on how state courts strategically manage the executive and legislative pro-
cesses of budgeting, then, necessitates more exploration. In fact, Tobin
and Hudzik (1993) argued that the “full effects of state financing are likely
to be uncovered only through in-depth case studies within individual
states” (p. 352). Therefore, large-scale survey work to assess state court
budget strategies is tantamount to putting the “cart before the horse.”
This article examines whether the independence of state courts is under
assault by budgetary politics. This study provides a comparative case
analysis of state court budgeting strategies in the two states of Oklahoma
and Virginia. The work is intended to explore an area of research that is
both lacking scholarly attention and that addresses a contemporary prob-
lem. Do governors and state legislatures use their budget powers to
threaten the independence of the judiciary? What weapons and strategies
do state courts use to negotiate state budgetary politics?
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METHOD
The data for this article came from a series of elite interviews con-
ducted with key members of the executive, judicial, and legislative
branches in the states of Virginia and Oklahoma. We chose the states of
Oklahoma and Virginia for two reasons. First, Oklahoma and Virginia
have similar systems for funding their courts. Tobin and Hudzik (1993)
classify their funding systems as “state financed with the exception of
facilities and some other major expenditures” (p. 344). Approximately a
quarter of the states were placed in this category by Tobin and Hudzik.
Second, Oklahoma and Virginia also display an important difference that
may make them useful for comparative purposes. The Oklahoma courts
submit their budget requests to the legislature directly, whereas the Vir-
ginia courts submit their requests to the governor, who is free to make
changes to it prior to sending it to the legislature. This represents a major
difference between states regarding judicial budgeting. State judges and
court administrators argue that as a separate branch of government, they
should be permitted to submit their budget requests directly to the legisla-
ture. They complain that requiring the courts to submit their requests
through the governor infringes on their independence (Baar, 1975b).
The similarities and differences of these state systems may uncover
interesting propositions about how state-financed systems navigate the
legislative and executive procedures of budgeting. Thus, our efforts
attempt to meet the standards suggested by Tobin and Hudzik (1993),
namely, that we need more in-depth case research and that research must
be mindful of the vast differences in funding systems. They argue that “a
sample of . . . about six states studied in some detail would offer valuable
insight into experiences with state financing” (Tobin & Hudzik, 1993,
p. 352). Although we do not explore beyond two states, the work is valu-
able as an effort to better link the fields of budgetary politics, court admin-
istration, and public law. Finally, the case comparison is primarily
intended as exploration and groundwork for further study.
In Oklahoma, we interviewed the director of the budget division within
the Office of State Finance (the governor’s budget office), the budget ana-
lyst in the Office of State Finance responsible for the judiciary, the director
of the fiscal analysts in the House of Representatives, the fiscal analyst in
the House of Representatives responsible for the judiciary, the director of
the fiscal analysts in the Senate, the fiscal analyst in the Senate responsible
for the judiciary, and the director of the Administrative Office of the
Courts. In Virginia, we interviewed the budget manager and analyst
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responsible for the Department of Planning and Budget (the governor’s
budget office), the fiscal analyst in the House of Delegates responsible for
the judiciary, the fiscal analyst in the Senate responsible for the judiciary,
and the executive secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia (chief
administrator for Virginia courts). The participants were selected because
of the important roles that they play in establishing, justifying, analyzing,
and approving the courts’ budget requests.
The interview format consisted of open-ended questions designed to
produce nonstructured responses. Each participant was promised that
their responses would not be attributed to them personally. The mean
interview time was 1 hour and 30 minutes. One author conducted all of the
interviews in Oklahoma, whereas the other author conducted all of the
interviews in Virginia. To deal with the potential problem of intercoder
reliability, we shared notes and discussed the meaning of responses in
detail. Even so, it is possible that similar respondent statements were inter-
preted differently or different respondent statements were interpreted
similarly. This must be kept in mind when reviewing the findings of the
article.
FINDINGS
THE BUDGET AS A WEAPON
One purpose of our study is to shed light on whether the governors and
legislatures in Oklahoma and Virginia used their budgetary powers to
threaten the independence of the judiciary. Officials from the three
branches of government in both states were questioned whether budgetary
powers or threats were used by executive and legislative officers in
response to unpopular court rulings. Evidence from the interviews indi-
cates that the executive and legislative branches in both states seem to
respect the independence of the courts in this regard. None of the officials
interviewed in either state could recall any attempts by the legislative or
executive branches to use their budgetary powers to influence or respond
to case rulings. Officials from each branch stated that no gubernatorial
vetoes, legislative cuts, line item restrictions, or apportionment powers
were employed to affect court verdicts. Additionally, judgeships were not
cut (or threatened to be cut) from the budget in either state on the basis of
how the courts had ruled. In fact, in Virginia, budget officials argued that
the creation of judicial seats was routine, even in times of divided
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government. The legislature and governor’s office both argued that new
seats were created when there was a demonstrated need (through a for-
mula). They did, however, mention that fights between the branches did
occur over individual appointments and confirmations.
Although the evidence from the interviews reveals that the governors
and legislatures in Oklahoma and Virginia do not threaten to use their bud-
getary powers to influence court decisions, officials in both states did
point out that this respect for the courts does not necessarily translate into
support for the courts. Executive and/or legislative approval of the entire
judicial budget request is not a foregone conclusion in either state. Mem-
bers of both legislatures and the governor in Virginia are willing to make
changes to the courts’ requests when they believe that the judiciary is ask-
ing for more than it needs, or their perceptions of the needs of the judiciary
differ from those of the courts. In Oklahoma, the major areas of contention
between the courts and the legislature are salary increases, particularly for
judges, and new positions. For example, several legislators in Oklahoma
are concerned that salaries for judges are increasing at a faster rate than
salaries for the rest of state government. Some members of the legislature
have also become concerned in recent years with judicial autonomy over
the spending of fines, fees, and forfeiture money collected by the courts at
the district level (see below). These members would like to see more legis-
lative control over such spending. In Virginia, the executive branch typi-
cally reduces the judicial budget from the amount requested and then pre-
sents it to the legislature. This is usually done because the governor
believes that the courts ask for more than they truly need. The legislature
ordinarily restores some, but not all, of what was subtracted by the gover-
nor. When queried on this point, several officials mentioned that the courts
saw the legislature as an opportunity to increase their appropriations.
Although all of the officials in these states mentioned the importance of
some deference to the courts on budgetary matters (i.e., because they are a
separate branch), they mentioned the political opportunity cost of financ-
ing the courts. The reality is that every dollar spent on the courts is one dol-
lar that cannot be spent on other policy issues (e.g., crime, education, capi-
tal projects). Governors and legislators often get more political “bang per
buck” by spending dollars elsewhere. Several officials stated that this is
why the courts are unable to get all of what they want during the appropria-
tions process. There are many needs that the executive and legislative
branches are trying to address, some of which are of more interest to their
constituents.
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The evidence discussed above reveals that the budgetary powers of the
executive and legislative branches in Oklahoma and Virginia are not used
to influence court rulings; however, these powers have been used to alter
and/or reduce judicial budget requests as a result of disagreements over
spending priorities. Although denying the judiciary additional funds for
the latter reason may harm the efficiency and effectiveness of the courts,
budget reductions do not necessarily constitute as great a threat to judicial
independence as threatening budgets in response to court rulings. These
findings beg the question of why the legislative and executive branches
have not employed their budgetary authority as a weapon to influence
unpopular rulings. This question will be addressed in the next section.
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST BUDGETARY
THREATS TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The interview data produced four explanations for why the courts in
Oklahoma and Virginia have not been subject to political budgetary
attacks by the executive and legislative branches: (a) respect for the inde-
pendence of the judicial branch, (b) rules and procedures that benefit the
judicial branch, (c) court budgetary strategies, and (d) important legisla-
tive allies of the judicial branch. The extent to which these factors are
important varies between the two states.
Respect for the Courts
According to the officials interviewed, both of the governors and most
members of the legislatures in Oklahoma and Virginia appreciate the
importance of an independent judiciary. In fact, the independence of the
judiciary is so respected that the budget requests of the judicial branch in
both states are not scrutinized to the extent that agency requests are during
the appropriations process. Although some members in the legislatures of
both states at times complain about individual court rulings, the majority
of members do not allow any budgetary intrusions into judicial preroga-
tives. As a result, what little contention there is between the courts and the
other two branches of government focuses on fiscal concerns such as the
size of pay raises for judges, rather than political concerns. Even in this
regard, as one budget official in Oklahoma put it, “The legislature usually
backs down when the judiciary starts screaming about money.”
Officials in Virginia, even more so than in Oklahoma, stressed the
important role that respect for the courts by the other branches plays in
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protecting court budgets. These officials indicated that even during times
of state budget crises, judicial independence is respected by the governor
and legislature. One example of this occurred during the recession in the
early 1990s, where the governor mandated budget cuts of discretionary
spending for state agencies. The courts, however, were only asked to make
these cuts because the governor saw a mandated cut as a threat to judicial
independence. It is interesting that the courts cut their budgets by a smaller
margin (3%) than did other agencies (ranging from 10-15%). When the
courts did not cut to the level of other state agencies, there were no repri-
sals from the other branches. This indicates that the governor and legisla-
ture in Virginia place a great deal of importance on not disrupting the per-
formance of court activities, even when being forced to make massive cuts
in executive branch functions. In contrast, officials in Oklahoma admitted
that the courts are often asked to make the same proportional cuts required
of executive branch agencies during times of fiscal stress.
Rules and Procedures
In Oklahoma, several budgetary rules and procedures have been estab-
lished that work to the judiciary’s advantage when protecting its budget.
First, judges’ salaries are mandated by statute. This forced the legislature
to appropriate sufficient funds to cover the current salaries of the state’s
judges. Because salary and benefits make up approximately 91% of state
appropriations for the courts, the legislature’s discretion to reduce the
judicial budget is limited. Should the legislature decide to cut court bud-
gets by reducing the salaries of judges, it would first have to change exist-
ing law. Second, unlike agencies in most states, the judiciary is permitted
to submit its budget requests for state appropriated funds directly to the
legislature (this is done by the chief justice of the state Supreme Court).
This allows the legislature to use the judiciary’s original request as a start-
ing point when making court funding decisions, rather than the recom-
mendation of the governor (which may differ from the original judicial
request) in his or her executive budget. As a result, the influence of the
governor’s recommendation on court appropriations is limited, thus
enabling judicial officials to focus their lobbying efforts on the legislature.
Third, the court funding system limits executive and legislative over-
sight, and grants the judiciary a considerable amount of control and dis-
cretion over its spending decisions. Funding for Oklahoma’s state courts
comes from three principal sources: District-level collections (approxi-
mately 62.7% of funding for the courts), the state general fund (approxi-
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mately 36.3%), and local government contributions (approximately
1.0%). District-level collections consist of fines, fees, and forfeitures col-
lected by the district courts. Each district court is permitted to use the
money it collects to fund district-level expenses such as juror fees, attor-
ney fees, office supplies, telephone expenses, and equipment purchases.
Any collections remaining after district expenses have been provided for
are placed into a special fund called the State Judicial Fund (SJF). Money
in this fund is earmarked to help pay the cost of state-level expenses but
must be appropriated by the legislature. In fiscal year (FY) 1998, $31.0
million in fines, fees, and forfeiture money was spent by district courts.
Another $22.0 million was put into the SJF. As stated above, state appro-
priated funds are used to cover the costs of judges’ salaries and benefits.
They are also used to pay for the salary and benefits of court staff, the
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), judge travel, equipment, and
operating expenses for the Supreme Court and Court of Civil Appeals.
Monies for state appropriations are drawn primarily from both the general
fund and the SJF.
The rules surrounding the use of court collections provide the judicial
branch in Oklahoma with one of its most important budgetary advantages.
Under this system, the district courts submit their budget requests for how
they want to spend their fines, fees, and forfeiture collections directly to
the chief justice of the state Supreme Court. The chief justice, with the
assistance of the AOC, is responsible solely for reviewing and approving
these requests; the governor and legislature play no role and are generally
not provided with copies of the requests or detailed information about how
the money is going to be spent. After approving the requests, the chief jus-
tice must provide the governor and legislature with an estimate of the
amount of court collected funds expected to be available for the SJF (Esti-
mate for the SJF = Estimated court collections – Estimated expenses at the
district level). This estimate gives the governor and legislature an idea of
how much money from the general fund will be needed to cover state-level
court expenditures for the coming fiscal year.
This system of funding gives the judiciary a great deal of discretion
over how it spends the fines, fees, and forfeitures money it collects at
the district level. The judiciary believes that it has the right to spend its
district-level collections any way it pleases. This, at times, causes hard-
ships on the legislature by forcing it to appropriate more general fund rev-
enues to the courts than it would normally like. Any increase in dis-
trict-level spending by the courts reduces the amount available in the SJF
for state appropriations to the courts. Because a large percentage of state
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appropriations is mandated by law (e.g., judges’ salaries), the legislature
has little discretion to lower them and is forced to offset any decreases in
the SJF with general revenues. As a result, the legislature is prevented
from spending those revenues on projects important to it. An extreme
example of this problem occurred during FY 1998.
In the FY 1998 supplemental appropriation, the legislature had to
appropriate an additional $3.3 million to the courts from general revenues.
This became necessary because court officials apparently underestimated
the contribution that would be made to the SJF for the fiscal year. This
error occurred because court officials failed to properly account for
increases in district-level expenditures due to a computer modernization
program, raises for staff, increases in district staff levels, and new rules
concerning court retirement funding. Once it became apparent during the
fiscal year that the SJF would fall short of its projections, the legislature
could do little more than either provide the funds from general revenues or
shut down the court system by laying off court employees and furloughing
judges. Events such as this caused some Oklahoma officials to complain
that the system provides the courts with an unfair budgetary advantage,
which can be used to draw resources away from other priorities in the
state. Other officials maintained that the funding system provides the judi-
cial branch with needed autonomy in determining how best to carry out its
important functions. Whichever the case, the judiciary’s management of
the fund system has enabled it to sustain a considerable amount of control
over its budget, which limits the ability of the legislature to use the budget
as a weapon.
The Virginia case differs considerably from Oklahoma. Unlike
Oklahoma, the judiciary in Virginia does not submit its budget request
directly to the legislature. Instead, after putting together the budget
request, the chief justice submits the request to the governor’s Department
of Planning and Budget. Here, the governor’s staff has the power to review
and alter the request prior to sending it on to the legislature as a part of the
governor’s executive budget document. Typically, governors in the state
have been inclined to give the courts what they received the prior year and
then consider additions to this base level. After receiving the governor’s
recommendation for the courts, the legislature serves as a sort of appeals
board to which the judiciary can go to protect any funding from their
request that the governor wishes to cut. This arrangement permits the gov-
ernor in Virginia to play a more active role in court appropriations because
his or her executive budget recommendation is viewed as a starting point
from which the legislature can make changes. In contrast, the governor’s
Douglas, Hartley / STATE COURT BUDGETING 67
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
request in Oklahoma is frequently ignored by the legislature, and the
courts’ requests are viewed as the starting point. As a result, judicial offi-
cials in Virginia must be more attuned to gubernatorial prerogatives than
their counterparts in Oklahoma.
Another major difference between Oklahoma and Virginia is the lack
of control the courts in Virginia have over their funding sources. Like
Oklahoma, most of the money the courts receive (approximately
80%-90%) is appropriated out of state funds by the legislature. The courts,
however, do not receive any of the fines, fees, and forfeiture money that
they collect directly. Interviewees agreed that most state officials do not
want to create the impression that the courts are padding their budgets by
increasing fines and/or fees (see Bresnick, 1982, 1993). For the most part,
then, funds collected by the courts are disbursed to the state general fund
from where they can be appropriated for any government purpose. Other
sources of funding include local counties, a court automation fund, and a
law library fund. Local counties varied in their support of local courts, but
they are largely responsible for funding the physical plant of the court and
sometimes contribute funds to aid local judges (e.g., conference money).
Finally, like Oklahoma, judicial salaries are largely protected against cuts
by law. The Virginia Constitution mandates that salaries of judges cannot
be cut during their tenure of office. It is possible that a salary could be cut
prior to a position being filled, but those interviewed found such a practice
to be highly unlikely.
Overall, rules and procedures grant the courts in Oklahoma consider-
able protections against budgetary encroachments against their independ-
ence by the executive and legislative branches. In fact, rules concerning
the SJF actually can be exploited by the courts to force the legislature to
divert funding away from other priorities important to it to meet the spend-
ing demands of the judiciary. The rules and procedures that guide judicial
budgeting in Virginia are not as court friendly. Theoretically, this makes
the courts in Virginia more vulnerable to budgetary transgressions against
their independence by the other two branches. In practice, however, such
transgressions have not occurred, at least in recent times.
Court Budgetary Strategies
Court officials in both Oklahoma and Virginia realize that public bud-
geting is a political process and that governors and legislators seek to use
the budget to achieve political gain. It is no secret that executive branch
agencies pursue various strategies to convince elected officials that their
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programs should receive sufficient funding (Rubin, 1997). Recognizing
that the executive and legislative branches hold the purse strings, state
courts engage in a number of strategies to ensure that they receive ade-
quate funding. The use of these strategies indicates the willingness of the
judiciary to participate in the political process of budgeting to ensure that
it receives sufficient resources and, more indirectly, to protect its inde-
pendence against budgetary encroachments. This section describes some
of the key budgetary strategies used by the courts in Oklahoma and Vir-
ginia and explains how those strategies can and are used to defend court
independence.
Like most executive branch agencies, the courts in Oklahoma and Vir-
ginia lobby the governor and legislature in their states to support judicial
budget requests. When engaged in lobbying activities, judicial officials
from both states emphasize the importance of maintaining the autonomy
of the third branch of government, stating that as a separate branch, the
judiciary is entitled to an adequate level of funding without interference
from the other two branches. Doing so is meant to instill in elected offi-
cials the notion that they have a moral obligation to fund the courts suffi-
ciently to protect the balance of power between the branches of govern-
ment. The need to protect this balance of power is enunciated particularly
through the lobbying activities of the chief justices and sometimes other
judges in both states. The participation of the chief justices and other
judges affixes a certain amount of prestige to court budget requests and
may sometimes awe elected officials into respecting and deferring to judi-
cial independence when considering the budget. The chief justice in
Oklahoma presents the judicial budget requests to the legislature person-
ally and gives a speech concerning the state of the courts. On rare occa-
sions, the chief justice and/or other judges have also been known to appear
at the legislative appropriations hearings or lobby individual members of
the legislature to emphasize the importance of funding particular activi-
ties. In Virginia, the chief justice does not present the budget personally to
the legislature but does appear on behalf of the courts at committee hear-
ings, personally lobbies members of the legislature, and indirectly lobbies
the office of the governor. Officials in Virginia said, however, that it is rare
for other judges to show up at legislative hearings, in part, because of the
undesirability of appearing to be “playing” politics. Virginia officials did
admit that indirect contacts between judges and legislators did occur and
worked to the advantage of the courts. In Virginia, judges are appointed by
the legislature, so there is often a history of close political contact between
judges and legislators. For example, judicial appointments can be
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sponsored by political friends in the legislature or by those who are well
known in the local party. Additionally, the local courthouse is the center of
politics in localities, and legislators, of course, spend much time with
those at the courthouse when back in their districts. Such informal con-
tacts between judges and legislators serve as a node by which to lobby.
A second strategy used by the courts in Oklahoma works to further
diminish the governor’s ability to alter judicial budget requests. The
courts are required by statute to submit their budget requests to the gover-
nor. However, the courts frequently ignore these statutory requirements.
As a separate branch of government, the judiciary believes that it is not
bound to submit its requests to the executive branch given that the power
of the purse rests with the legislative branch. The courts argue that the leg-
islature does not have to submit a budget request to the governor and,
therefore, it is not necessary for the judiciary to do so. The courts some-
times submit a copy of their requests to the governor as a courtesy, but the
requests are seldom delivered in time for the governor to incorporate them
into his or her executive budget. This does not work against the courts
because the budgetary powers of the governor are somewhat weak,1 and as
stated above, the legislature usually ignores the recommendation of the
governor when approving the court’s budget.
The courts in Oklahoma and Virginia also engage in some of the same
types of budgetary “shell” games employed by many executive branch
agencies. For example, the courts employ strategies like budgeting for
vacant positions they have no intention of filling, promising to spend
money for a particular function and then transferring much of the funds to
something else during the fiscal year, and asking for more than they really
need in their requests. This sort of padding is done to help offset antici-
pated cuts in budget requests and provide the courts with more spending
flexibility. If the governor or legislature attempt to cut judicial budgets in
retaliation for court rulings or policy, then padding can be used by the
courts to ensure that funding needs are met. For the most part, however, the
courts in Oklahoma and Virginia pad to offset cuts due to fiscal reasons
(e.g., the legislature wants the money to fund something else). Addi-
tionally, most officials in both states said that the courts do not engage in
these practices as often or to the extent that executive branch agencies do.
The judiciary in Oklahoma appears to be slightly more willing to play
budgetary shell games, whereas the courts in Virginia seem to take pride in
trying to show that they are not requesting more than they need. A likely
explanation for the unwillingness of the courts in both states to play shell
games with their budget requests is their desire to maintain their
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credibility and thus sustain the respectful relationships that they have with
the executive and legislative branches.
Mobilizing political allies outside of the legislature to lobby on behalf
of the courts is another strategy that could be used to help the judiciary
should its independence be threatened. The courts in Oklahoma and Vir-
ginia have practiced this strategy on rare occasion when, for fiscal reasons,
their legislatures were less supportive than the courts would have liked.
Unfortunately for the courts, they have few allies to turn to. Only two
interest groups in Oklahoma have lobbied on the courts’ behalf during the
budgetary process: the Court Clerks Association and the Bar Association.
The courts in Oklahoma have also turned to sympathetic governors in the
past to help convince the legislature that court requests need to be met.
In Virginia, allies were used even less. The actors typically remarked
that few others were interested in the needs of the courts unless it benefited
them. The two groups that occasionally did lobby on behalf of court fund-
ing were the court clerks in Virginia and defense attorneys. The clerks lob-
bied for personnel and salary increases, whereas the defense attorneys
typically lobbied for a higher per hour fee for representing indigent defen-
dants. All actors agreed that the Virginia Bar rarely if ever came to the aid
of the courts, because they were often lobbying for and against issues of
direct concern to them (e.g., tort reform, bar requirements, etc.). This evi-
dence suggests that the courts may not get much support from other
groups should the governor or legislature assault their budgets for political
reasons. However, it is also possible that because the courts have not been
threatened in such a way, they have had little need to mobilize potential
allies. Therefore, they have chosen to remain “above politics” in this
regard.
A final strategy available to the courts in Oklahoma and Virginia is
their ability to issue a writ of mandamus. Should the legislature in either
state fail to provide the courts with enough funding to perform their duties,
the chief justices in both states have the power to issue such a writ that
forces the legislature to relinquish funds to the courts. Judicial officials in
Oklahoma have on occasion pointed out to the governor and legislature
that the state constitution entitles the judicial branch to receive adequate
funding to carry out its responsibilities and that a writ of mandamus might
be issued if state appropriations are not satisfactory to the courts. Such an
order has not been necessary to date, but there is an undertone that a writ is
always possible if the courts do not get enough of what they want. Chief
justices in Oklahoma have used the threat of a writ sparingly, rarely warn-
ing directly that one will be issued if more funding is not forthcoming. In
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contrast, Virginia officials reported that the judiciary in their state has
never threatened to issue a writ of mandamus. It is possible that such
threats are not necessary because, as “repeat players” in government, the
other branches in Virginia recognize the courts’ power of judicial review
and the ability to issue writs of mandamus. Short-term strikes by the other
branches against the budgets of the courts might be viewed as irrational in
the long term given that they must work together in the future.
Overall, the judiciary in Oklahoma appears to be more proactive in its
use of budgetary strategies than the courts in Virginia. It is possible that
the courts in Virginia play a more passive role because they feel more
comfortable with the level of deference granted them by the other two
branches and do not feel the need to press budget issues further. An alter-
native explanation is that the Virginia courts have fewer budget “weap-
ons” and, therefore, fear that a more proactive use of strategies might irri-
tate the more powerful branches.
Legislative Allies of the Courts
A final factor, which plays a role in protecting the independence of the
judiciary against budgetary threats, is the existence of important allies of
the courts in the legislature. One important reason the legislature in
Oklahoma is reluctant to use its budgetary powers against the courts is the
large number of lawyers serving as legislators, particularly in the Senate.
According to those interviewed, lawyers tend to be the biggest supporters
of the courts in the legislature. The budget officers interviewed were split
as to why lawyers are so supportive. Three of the seven Oklahoma officials
speculated that lawyer members do not want judges angry with them when
arguing cases in court. However, two others stated that getting on the
courts’ bad side because of budgetary decisions is unlikely to harm a
member’s practice. These officials argued that the strong support from
lawyer members is more likely due to their experience with the courts in
their private practices, giving them a greater respect for the independence
of the courts and a greater knowledge and awareness of the courts’ needs.
One official also suggested that several lawyer members support the
courts during the budgetary process because they aspire to become judges
some day. Whatever the reasons, lawyers in the Oklahoma legislature are
strong supporters of court autonomy in the budgetary process. The
Oklahoma Senate (26% lawyers) tends to be more supportive than the
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Oklahoma House (12% lawyers). In fact, lawyers in the Senate, according
to one budget officer, have been largely responsible for blocking a move
by House members to limit court discretion over the use of court collected
revenues.
In Virginia, lawyer support may also be a factor in legislative success;
lawyers constitute 36% of House members and 25% of Senate members.
However, budget actors in the state did not mention this specifically as
being an important factor in securing judicial funding. Apart from the per-
ceived interest in one day becoming judges, the Virginia legislature has
the added connection of having selected the judges. Their past political
experience with judges (e.g., the appointment of friends and law partners)
might help ensure that courts are respected by the legislative body.
Legislative support for court budgets in both states can also be attrib-
uted to the political self-interest of members. One official in Oklahoma
stated that legislative candidates seek the support of local district court
officials, especially judges, when running for office. There was also evi-
dence of this in interviews with officials of Virginia. As stated earlier, leg-
islative candidates in Virginia often turn to the local courthouse, as the
center of local politics, for support in the election. Once elected, the legis-
lators continue to rely on courthouse officials for support and often work
in local courthouses as attorneys. Legislators in both states also gain polit-
ically from supporting local court projects such as establishing video
courtrooms in their local courthouses. These types of projects bring jobs
and money to their districts. Although the dollar amounts for these proj-
ects may be small, they do provide legislators with an incentive to protect
court budgets.
So it seems that both the political self-interest and high ideals of legis-
lators play a role in preserving judicial independence. Some legislators
who propose to cut court budgets in response to a particular ruling or court
policy will be forced to confront colleagues who want to either protect
judicial pork going to their districts or maintain good relations with influ-
ential local officials such as court clerks and judges. Perhaps it is more
important that threatening the courts in this way may draw the ire of legis-
lators in the law profession who might see such a move as morally and eth-
ically inappropriate. This is an advantage that few if any executive branch
agencies share with the courts because few agencies have similar ties with
a profession whose members hold such a significant portion of the seats in
legislative bodies.
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CONCLUSION
In this article, we examined the assertion that state courts are being held
hostage by the budgetary powers of the other branches of government.
Our interviews with officials from Virginia and Oklahoma produced no
evidence that such a threat exists. Although the courts in both states do not
get everything that they ask for in their budget requests, this does not nec-
essarily constitute a threat to their independence. After all, officials in the
executive and legislative branches at all levels of government often com-
plain that they do not have enough resources to carry out their missions as
effectively as they would like. No one argues that this somehow threatens
the independence of those branches. Scarce resources are a fact of life in
the public sector, and it is difficult to argue that the courts, because of their
nonpolitical status, deserve all that they ask for.
Attacking court budgets for political reasons, however, would consti-
tute a threat to judicial independence. We attribute the absence of such
attacks in Oklahoma and Virginia to four factors: (a) respect for the judi-
ciary, (b) rules and procedures favorable to the courts, (c) court budgetary
strategies, and (d) legislative allies. It is interesting to note that the
Oklahoma courts appear to be in a better position to defend themselves
against budgetary assaults than are the courts in Virginia. This is because
the rules and procedures in Oklahoma are extremely favorable to the
courts, and the judiciary in Oklahoma is more aggressive in the use of the
strategies available to it. Surprisingly, this has not resulted in greater trans-
gressions against the judicial budget in Virginia. The Virginia judiciary
seems to depend more on the respect it receives as an independent branch
from the governor and legislature. Relying primarily on this respect may
leave the Virginia courts more vulnerable to budgetary threats in the long
run. However, one might want to consider the motivation behind executive
and legislative respect for the judiciary in regards to the budget. The
behavior of the other branches might be very rational here given that
short-term strikes against the courts might lead to strained relations in the
future. Additionally, the threat of judicial review and writs of mandamus,
although they have never been used in Virginia, provide the courts with a
couple of powerful weapons of their own.
Although political events in other arenas may be working to dim the
sparkle of judicial independence, the results of our study indicate that the
budgetary powers of the executive and legislative branches are not being
used to diminish the luster of this “crown jewel” at the state level. For
those who believe that the use of budgetary powers to influence court
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rulings is a legitimate check on the powers of the judiciary, our findings
reveal that this opinion is not necessarily shared by those who hold the
seats of power in the executive and legislative branches. Budgetary pow-
ers, at least in Oklahoma and Virginia, are not used as a weapon against
unpopular court rulings. Those who agree with de Tocqueville
(1835/1956) that an independent judiciary vested with the ability to
impartially make rulings “forms one of the most powerful barriers which
has ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies” (p. 76),
should take heart after reviewing our findings. Although no one should
rely completely on the results of a single study of only two states, our evi-
dence generates some very interesting propositions that could be tested in
a larger study of state court budgeting. For example, interviews with the
executive and legislative branches showed a tremendous amount of
respect for the independence of the judicial branch. However, one won-
ders if such findings will hold true over time as states continue to rely more
and more on state funding versus local sources (see Tobin & Hudzik,
1993). Additionally, this finding has a more significant meaning beyond
budgetary politics and may signify that judicial independence is under
less of a threat from other, nonbudgetary, types of political actions.
Respect for judicial independence in the budget arena might translate to
respect in other arenas as well.
Additionally, as an exploratory study, this article has set the ground-
work for further research into state court activities during the budgetary
process. Different models of budget submission and appropriation seem
to show variation and raise questions as to how much the courts are at the
mercy of the other branches. In Virginia, where SJFs do not exist, the
courts are more limited in seeking resources. Courts may, then, look to
other agencies and other states for models for improving funding levels.
This study also reveals that the courts recognize the importance of playing
an active role in gaining support for judicial operations in the political
environment of public budgeting. Again, however, budget actors tend to
believe that courts could do better in the political arena. For instance,
Oklahoma and Virginia courts’ strategies are somewhat conservative
when compared with other branches (e.g., making use of coalition build-
ing and lobbying). One factor here might be the tradition of the courts as
being “above” or outside of politics. The Virginia example also reveals
that institutional differences among states might predict the ability of
courts to obtain funding (e.g., the Virginia method of judicial selection
and retention of judges).
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This inductive approach at studying state court budgeting has provided
us with numerous research questions of interest to scholars of budgeting,
public law, and American politics in general. What does state court bud-
geting look like when we analyze all 50 states? For instance, do state legis-
latures, courts, and governors behave as rational actors in the process of
budgeting for state courts? What types of budget politics exist in states that
primarily receive funds from local sources? Do courts receive less funding
than other agencies given their position as a separate branch? Do courts
behave less politically than other branches, and why? Finally, is the inde-
pendence of courts in other states under attack via their budgets? Because
our data come from only two states, more research needs to be conducted.
It is possible that future research will find that court strategies and deter-
minants of success will vary in different states. A survey of budget actors
in the 50 states should take us further down the road of broadly under-
standing the politics of state court budgeting. Additionally, a larger sam-
ple of in-depth case comparisons may uncover variations in court strate-
gies that exist internally. Tobin and Hudzik (1993) argue that future
studies of this type could compare and contrast states with varying popula-
tions and varying systems of obtaining funds (e.g., state vs. local).
NOTE
1. The budgetary powers of the governor in Oklahoma are weakened by two factors.
First, agencies are permitted to submit their budget requests directly to the legislature. Sec-
ond, the governor does not have the power to remove most agency heads from office.
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